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  1 
European Citizenship: Towards a European Identity? 
Percy B. Lehning 




Questions of political identity and citizenship, raised by the creation of the 'new Europe', 
pose new questions that political theorists need to consider. Reflection upon the 
circumstances of the new Europe could help them in their task of delineating conceptual 
structures and investigating the character of political argument. 
  Does it make sense to use concepts as 'citizenship' and 'identity' beyond the borders 
of the nation-state? What does it mean when we speak about 'European Citizenship' and 
'European Identity'?   
  It is argued that the pluralism that has led theorists to offer a conception of 
citizenship based upon principles of right, rather than the common good, applies even more 
strongly at the level of the European political order. Developing a contractarian theory of 
federation, an account of the basis of a European citizenship will be offered in which 
federalism emerges out of an overlapping consensus of European citizens on the terms of 
their political association.  
  'European Citizenship' and 'European Identity' are discussed in the context of the so-
called 'European Union', and not in the wider context of Europe 'as a whole', or for that 
matter on an even broader 'cosmopolitan' scale. However, the gist of the paper is that 
arguments for concepts of 'citizenship' and 'identity' that go beyond borders of nation-states 
and that are applied to the 'European Union', could have implications for an even wider 
application. 
  Finally, and in conclusion, the (empirical) context will be elaborated in which the 
normative concept of shared liberal citizenship identity should be realized on a pan-
national, European level. 
  2Introduction 
The issue of European citizenship usually turns around a conception of individuals as 
citizens of states which are themselves members of the European Union. The term 
'European citizenship' is perceived as a condition by which people from different nations 
should have similar rights to be asserted vis-à-vis the European public courts and public 
officials. In fact, this conception of citizenship has by and large been accomplished within 
the European Union and this is a major achievement which should not be belittled.  
  What is, however, more vigorously contested is a conception of citizenship in which 
individuals are seen as immediate bearers of EU citizenship, as sharing a common identity, 
a common responsibility and "the excitement and anticipation of future common 
endeavour." (Pérez-Díaz, 1998: 235). 
  This envisages a conception of European citizenship in which the core elements of 
citizenship, rights and identity, are not 'attached' to citizens as members of separate member 
states that together form the European Union, but to citizens as citizens of the European 
Union, perceived as a democratic political union. In this perspective European identity is 
the disposition of different nationals to consider themselves, their compatriots and their 
foreign fellow-Europeans as equal members of the European community: it refers to equal 
concern and respect.  
  But why should one want to defend this more encompassing idea of citizenship? 
One reason is that the obvious increase of the power of the EU is not being matched by a 
like increase in legitimation through the consent of the citizens of the member states. There 
is a gap between fairly elaborate devices of democratic legitimation in the several national 
members state and the advancing exodus of the powers of these to the organs of the 
  3supranational Community. Presently "the citizens of the Member States enjoy rights and are 
subject to duties which do not originate in their respective national parliaments. The citizens 
of the Member States are subject to legal provisions emanating from Community organs 
(the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament) which articulate the will of the 
'Community', or, in the case of the European Parliament, the will of 'the peoples of the 
States brought together in the community'; but it is not the will of a European people or 
demos, i.e., the unity of the citizens of the Union." (Preuss, 1995: 214). 
  If a central premise of legitimate political rule is, that those who are affected by 
political decisions, should be able to participate in legitimating activities of their common 
affairs, the idea of European citizenship should entail, or so I argue, accountability, not to 
the separate peoples of Europe, but accountability to the people of Europe as a whole.
1 
  In the following this idea of European citizenship will be developed from a political 
theoretical perspective. We will inquire into its empirical impediments, and we will - these 
impediments not withstanding - argue that a first necessity for a democratic political 
European Union is the institutionalization of this conception of European citizenship, to 
prevent a decline in legitimacy with regard to the EU by the citizens of the member states. 
Citizens should not only demand a greater and more direct voice and vote in the governance 
of their increasingly common affairs, they are entitled to it. 
 
Conceptions of Citizenship 
Before we can answer what, from the perspective of political theory, it means when we 
speak about 'European Citizenship', and ask if it makes sense to use the concept 'citizenship' 
beyond the borders of a nation-state, we have to clarify the meaning of the concept 
  4'citizenship' within the borders of a nation-state.
2  
  Although 'citizenship' is an essential contested concept, theorizing about citizenship 
requires always that one takes up questions having to do with membership, (national) 
identity, civic allegiance, and all the commonalities of sentiment and obligation that prompt 
one to feel that one belongs to this political community rather than that one.
3 Conceptions 
of citizenship, always "defines those who are, and who are not, members of a common 
society". (Barbalet, 1988: 1). 
  Modern discussions on citizenship tend to take the ideas developed by T. H. 
Marshall in his lecture of 1949, 'Citizenship and Social Class' as a starting point. I will do 
the same, be it that these ideas will be used in the first place for a political theoretical 
discussion of citizenship, and not for an (empirical) political sociological one. Marshall 
noted that citizenship is captured by full membership of a community, where membership 
entails participation by individuals in the determination of the conditions of their own 
association.
4 Different types of political community give rise to different forms of 
citizenship. He differentiated between three layers of citizenship rights, civil, political and 
social rights, and the institutions which support them.
5   
  There is, here, clearly a focus on equality: citizenship is about expanding and 
enriching the notion of equality by extending its scope through civil, political and social 
rights (to public education, health care, unemployment insurance, and old-age pension).
6 
These rights are, of course, the traditional components of a welfare state - confronting the 
risks of sickness, old age, invalidity, unemployment, and poverty. By guaranteeing these 
rights to all, a welfare state ensures that every member of society can feel like a full member 
of society. When fully developed it embodies an idea of social justice: everyone is to enjoy 
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market driven by considerations of efficiency.
7 
  But citizenship is not only a legal status, defined by a set of rights and 
responsibilities. It is also an identity, an expression of one's membership in a political 
community. Marshall, as well, saw citizenship as a shared identity that would integrate 
previously excluded groups and provide a source of national unity in British society.  
  The discussion on citizenship can be summarized by stating that the concept of 
citizenship has two constitutive elements: rights and identity, (or belonging). Each of these 
elements must be experienced in a geographical context, regardless of the fact how this 
geographical context is defined. The function of citizen can be discharged at a multitude of 
levels, from local government and functional interest groups, on to the region, nation, and 
eventually on to the cosmopolis. (Heater, 1990: 318-9). 
  If 'citizenship' has to do with rights and identity, then clearly two dimensions are 
involved: a 'liberal' one and a 'communitarian' one. Citizenship is "intimately linked to the 
ideas of individual entitlement on the one hand and of attachment to a particular community 
on the other". (Kymlicka and Norman, 1995: 283). In that sense, the debate on citizenship is 
closely linked to the political theoretical debate between liberals and communitarians.
8 For 
our purpose here, the important point to note is that the alternative theoretical perspectives 
of citizenship, seem to be: 
*: a liberal one in which individual identity is emphasized; and   
*: a communitarian one, emphasizing cultural or ethnic group solidarity. There is here a 
conjunction of identity: it is a 'communalist' identity, nationalism being an example.
9 
  The problem with this dichotomy is that both liberal and communitarian theories 
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two aspects: rights and identity. Both perspectives, the liberal and the communitarian one, 
jeopardize the idea of political community that is neither reducible to an aggregation of 
individuals nor to a conjunction of identity-constituting groups. Noting this problem, Beiner 
points out the tension between the egalitarian element of shared citizenship, appealing to 
what is shared across divergent cultural or ethnic groups, which may be undercut by the 
emphasis upon particularistic identity. (Beiner, 1995: 14; 11).  
  This is the core of the problem when developing a coherent and realistic conception 
of citizenship: How to cope with two competing visions: liberal universalism and illiberal 
particularism? This is the so-called dilemma of the 'universalism / particularism 
conundrum'. (ibid.: 12).  
  What synthesis, or 'third' conception of citizenship, would help us out of this 
conundrum?
10 Such a conception has, first of all, to take into account the increasing social 
and cultural pluralism of modern society. Due to this fragmentation there is less 
convergence or agreement between members of a specific society then there once used to 
be. The question has become what "draws a body of citizens together into a coherent and 
stably organized political community, and keeps that allegiance durable"? (ibid.: 1).  
  The classical answer is, as mentioned above, given by Marshall. It can, however, be 
argued that his view runs into difficulties once the idea of a common civilization, a national 
unity is challenged by the emergence of increasing social and cultural pluralism. Despite the 
possession of common rights of citizenship, members may feel excluded.
11  
  How, then, to revise current definitions of citizenship to accommodate increasing 
pluralism of modern societies, and how to ensure that citizenship can indeed provide a 
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no longer a shared or 'common heritage', or 'way of life' by reference to which citizens' 
rights can be defined? (Kymlicka and Norman, 1995: 286). On what should "a shared 
citizenship identity that will supersede rival identities based on ethnicity", be based? (ibid.: 
309).  
  Beiner, for instance, opts for a conception of citizenship, labelled by him 
'republicanism', in which 'civic bonds' are emphasized. It is "the requirement that all citizens 
conform to a larger culture, but this culture is national-civic, not national-ethnic. It refers to 
political, not social allegiance". Membership in the state is identified, not membership in 
civil society. (Beiner, 1995: 12; 8). 
  Habermas's answer to the conflict between the universalistic principles of 
constitutional democracies on the one hand, and the particularistic claims of commitments 
to preserve the integrity of habitual ways of life on the other, is 'constitutional patriotism': 
an idea that is neither individualist nor communitarian, neither liberal nor anti-liberal. It is 
based on the changed meaning of the term 'nation' from designating a pre-political entity "to 
something that was supposed to play a constitutive role in defining the political identity of 
the citizen within a democratic polity." (Habermas, 1992: 3). A nation of citizens does not 
derive its identity from some ethnic and cultural properties, but "rather from the praxis of 
citizens who actively exercise their civil rights." (ibid.: 3). This republican strand of 
citizenship, "completely parts company with the idea of belonging to a pre-political 
community integrated on the basis of descent, a shared tradition and a common language." 
(ibid.: 3). It is the political culture that is shared and that is the common denominator in 
which the constitutional principles are rooted, and which is the base for constitutional 
  8patriotism. It also means that - although the political culture is shared - all citizens do not 
share the same language or the same ethnic and cultural origins. On the contrary: they are 
aware that they are a part of a multicultural society.
12 
  The important point to note here is that the normative content of citizenship is 
dissociated from national identity based on 'ethnos'. What is significant about ethnicity is 
that it is negative: it is not (generally speaking) possible to join an ethnic group by an act of 
will. Individuals cannot choose their ethnicity. The reason why ethnicity cannot in itself be 
a basis for common citizenship is that there is no necessary connection between 'descent', 
which is a matter of biology, and interest, which is a matter of the fulfilment of human 
needs and purposes. (Barry, 1991: 169).
13  
  Thus, when discussing liberal democratic citizenship, 'demos' and 'ethnos' are 
separated. To be sure: in this interpretation of citizenship, which tries to cope with the 
'universalism / particularism conundrum', cultural or ethnic pluralism is not denied. What is 
denied, is that ethnic characteristics should play a role in determining (national) identity. 
Instead, identity should be based on the democratic constitutional principles that are rooted 
in a political culture which serves as the common base or denominator. It is the praxis of 
citizens who actively exercise their civil rights, that generates this identity and forms the 
basis of socio-political allegiance, or socio-political cohesion. The demos that constitutes 
the political association is potentially inclusive of all those remaining outside, legally, 
socially and physically, or inclusive of those who, in their private or personal lives have a 
specific conception of the good or different ethno-cultural backgrounds.   
  Here we touch upon a fundamental principle that is commonly shared in modern 
liberal theories. In a liberal political order the state and its laws should remain neutral with 
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neutrality is an important aspect of liberalism because, once one acknowledges the fact that 
there exists pluralism and reasonable disagreement on the idea of the good life, it enables 
individuals to have the freedom to choose between those ideas.
14 Neutrality is seen as a 
political ideal: it governs state policies and institutions, the public relations between persons 
and the state, and not the private relations between persons and other institutions. 
Liberalism is in this view not seen as a philosophy of man, but as a philosophy of politics. 
(Larmore, 1987: 139). Thus the consequence of the fact of reasonable pluralism is the 
denial that effective citizenship requires the state, or the political culture to advance a 
particular vision of the good.  
  In the following it will be argued that a 'liberal democratic conception of 
citizenship', based on the political theory of John Rawls, gives us a political theoretical 
argument for citizenship that guarantees 'shared citizenship identity'; a conception that can 
cope with the fact of cultural and ethnic pluralism of modern societies, and can create a 
common identity. 
 
A Liberal Democratic Conception of Citizenship  
Rawls' interpretation of liberalism differentiates between personal and political ideals, 
between homme and citoyen.
15 His political theory is a theory about citoyen. It formulates a 
liberal democratic theory of citizenship.
16 It is developed in response to 'the fact of 
reasonable pluralism': the fact that "the diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern democratic societies is not a mere 
historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture 
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17  
  This pluralism raises a fundamental problem. No general and reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine can assume the role of a publicly acceptable basis of political 
justice, or be the base of a shared conception of citizenship. The public role of a neutrally 
recognized political conception of justice, and with it a conception of citizenship is, then, to 
specify a point of view from which all citizens can examine before one another whether or 
not their political institutions are just. The political conception of justice comprises the 
substantive principles of justice, worked out to apply to the basic structure of a modern 
constitutional democracy. It involves, as far as possible, no prior commitment to any wider 
doctrine, but is formulated "in terms of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the 
public political culture of a democratic society." (ibid.: 13).
18 
   These ideas on political liberalism, and its related conception of political justice 
helps us to answer how a political order in which citizens are deeply divided by conflicting 
and even incommensurable reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines, 
nevertheless can be stable and just. (ibid.: 133). 
  There are three possible bases of a political order: one based on a universal 
acceptance of some particular comprehensive moral doctrine, one based on a modus 
vivendi, and one based on an 'overlapping consensus'. The crucial question is: which will 
guarantee stability and social unity over time within that political order? 
  The fact of reasonable pluralism rules out the first base of social union. Such 
agreement would require state coercion incompatible with democracy. A second possibility 
would be a modus vivendi agreement on basic principles of cooperation between groups of 
individuals with differing reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines, adopted by each party 
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the demands of democracy. But he argues against such a conception because it is inherently 
unstable, given its dependence on "happenstance and a balance of relative forces." (ibid.: 
148).  
  The third possibility is the idea of finding an overlapping consensus around a 
political conception of justice. Justification, when arguing about the question whether or not 
political institutions are just, has to proceed from some consensus. In this process of 
justification, an overlapping consensus plays an essential role. It is independent of shifts in 
the distribution of power, in contrast with the stability of a modus vivendi. Unlike a modus 
vivendi, it is a moral commitment in social union and thus less prone to desertion when it is 
to one's party advantage. And unlike a comprehensive moral doctrine, it demands only 
limited moral commitment. The core of this overlapping consensus is, then, a shared 
political culture. This is the common denominator, and it is in this common denominator 
that democratic constitutional principles are rooted. This consensus can, then, be reached by 
people with differing reasonable comprehensive doctrines and justified varyingly, according 
to those same doctrines. It eventually creates citizenship with a common legal and political 
identity. 
  There is, as mentioned earlier, a sharp distinction between how we understand 
ourselves as citizens within the political system and how we may regard ourselves in our 
personal affairs or within certain intermediate associations. It is for this reason that Rawls 
sees the members of liberal democracies as having a double identity, resulting in two kinds 
of commitments and attachments. (ibid.: 30-2). In their personal or private capacity they are 
seen as holding a conception of the good, a view about what a valuable life consists of. This 
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their identity as a matter of basic law. Citizens have usually both political and non-political 
aims and commitments. 
  Citizens' identities should take precedence over personal identities in the sense that 
people will agree to continue to confine the pursuit of their personal conception of the good 
within the bounds prescribed by the principles of justice. We think of ourselves as citizens 
first, and as citizens we implement only measures which we can justify to others who do not 
share our personal conceptions of the good. 
  A liberal democratic conception of citizenship acknowledges the equal ability of 
citizens to pursue in one's life an ideal of the good of one's own choosing. It implies the 
rejection of the idea that the state should or could be seen as a community, defined by a 
substantive ideal.  
  In answering, then, the question how to cope with the dilemma of the 'universalism / 
particularism conundrum', our conclusion is that the principle of neutrality should strongly 
be defended against communitarian arguments. The communitarian view is that the political 
order must subordinate justice to a higher, more substantive ideal than the conceptions of 
the good citizens have.
19 Those communitarian ideas, however, make freedom, the freedom 
of choice of one's own conception of the good, impossible. But at the same time it should be 
stressed that the idea of freedom of choice does not reject the importance of the idea of 
'belonging', or of a 'sense of community'. But it does, indeed, reject for instance Sandel's 
suggestion that we should give up the 'politics of rights' for a 'politics of the common 
good'.
20 
  For our present argument it is not really important if the substantive principles of 
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justice, 'justice as fairness' so to speak, or other principles of justice, as long as we agree that 
the principles formulate liberal ideas of justice, similar to but more general than 'justice as 
fairness'. It should be, in all cases, principles that are basic to any welfare state, and give a 
political theoretical argument for the rights Marshall thought were constitutive for 
citizenship.  
  We have claimed that the overlapping consensus that results in a political 
conception of justice, shared throughout a political community, does generate a shared 
identity, indeed, a shared citizenship identity that will supersede rival identities based on, 
for instance, ethnicity. It should be stressed that this idea, especially the idea of a public, or 
institutional identity, is of course based on the fact the Rawls' theory is a contractarian 
theory. The basic idea of the conception of liberal democratic citizenship is that the public 
or institutional identity of citizens is contractually founded. The idea of, at least, a 'double 
identity', is a basic element of this contractual reasoning and conception of citizenship. If 
one would argue  
  "that 'identities are founded morally and pre-contractually' which means that the 
political community is a 'community of character, historical stable, an association of 
men and women especially committed the ones to the others, and endowed with a 
specific sense of their common life'" (Meehan, 1993: 22),  
 
we would not have been able to step out of the communitarian or Gemeinschaft outlook in 
the first place, and would not have been able to argue for a conception of liberal democratic 
citizenship which is neither universalistic, nor particularistic, and that can cope with the 
diversity of modern multi-cultural societies.  
 
  14Citizenship and Constitutional Democracy 
What kind of institutions of the basic structure of constitutional democratic societies 
support this conception of liberal democratic citizenship, and would generate the public, or 
institutional, identity, or the identity as a matter of basic law of citizens? The institutions of 
constitutional democracies should satisfy four conditions: respect for the rule of law; the 
protection of fundamental freedoms (which includes the right to form independent 
associations); secure, though not constitutionally entrenched, property rights; and: 
conformity to the principle of majority rule in the making of public policy. (Rawls, 1971: 
221-43). 
  The first three of these conditions stipulate the requirements of constitutional 
government, and the fourth condition stipulates that the constitutional government should 
also be democratic. To be 'democratic' can be specified more precise. Dahl has formulated 
five criteria that fully specify the democratic process. When making binding collective 
decisions the following conditions should not be violated: 
* Equal votes; 
* Effective participation; 
* Enlightened understanding; 
* Inclusiveness: the demos must include all adult members except transients and persons 
proven to be mentally defective; 
* Citizens have to exercise final control over their own agenda.   
Final control of the agenda by the demos means that the demos must have exclusive 
opportunity to make decisions that determine what matters are and are not to be decided by 
processes that satisfy the first three criteria. (Dahl, 1983: 95; 1985: 59-60). 
  15  We stipulate, following Albert Weale (1997), three further assumptions. The first of 
these is that the majoritarian principle implies a representative assembly with decision-
making powers and not merely consultative powers. The second assumption is that there is 
a burden of proof upon the anti-majoritarian. This assumption is the democratic premise 
throughout the whole argument formulated here, namely that accountability is normally 
essential to the exercise of political authority: 
  "[W]henever there are political institutions making authoritative decisions for a 
population, then those institutions should be accountable to the population in the 
form of a representative assembly from which a government is chosen based upon 
the support of a majority of the representatives." (Weale, 1977: 126).   
 
The third assumption is that arguments about how best to justify one set of political 
arrangements relative to others ought ultimately to make reference to the interests of 
individuals, and cannot stop at the interests of collective entities like cultures, churches, 
communities or languages. This individualist assumption is, of course, in line with the 
argument, given earlier, that we have to take into account the social and cultural pluralism 
of modern societies, and that from a liberal perspective citizens should have the equal 
ability to choose their own conception of the good. It is, in fact, a minimal democratic 
criterion: the interests of each person are entitled to equal consideration, and in the absence 
of a compelling evidence to the contrary an adult is assumed to understand his or her own 
interests better than another. (Dahl, 1983: 107). 
  To recapitulate, we see that the second constitutive element of citizenship, identity, 
requires a democratic process with accountability, based on shared principles of democracy 
and social justice. We should add, however, that it has become clear that procedural-
institutional mechanisms, based on the institutional design of liberal constitutional 
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intermediate in a successful way between 'the private and the public', the egoistical and 
altruistic sources of action. An additional element is needed to strengthen a sense of 
community among and between social actors who are conceived of as autonomous 
individuals, acknowledging pluralism as well as the fact that men and women are motivated 
by two divergent and contradictory principles: those of altruism and egoism.
21  
 
Citizenship and Civil Society 
I suggest that the idea of 'civil society' is this additional element to strengthen a sense of 
community among and between social actors, if we understand civil society to refer to 'a 
space or arena between households and the state which affords possibilities of concerted 
action and social self-organization'.
22 Civil society, or 'civic space', occupies the middle 
ground between government and the private sector. It is the space we occupy when we are 
engaged neither in government activities (voting, paying taxes) nor in commerce (working, 
producing, shopping, consuming).
23 It is in this civic space that people are 'public' beings, 
and in that sense civil society shares with government a sense of public sphere and a regard 
for the general good and the common weal, but unlike government it makes no claims to 
exercise a monopoly on legitimate coercion. Rather, it is a voluntary realm devoted to 
public goods. It is constituted by freely associated individuals and groups; but unlike the 
private sector, it aims at common ground and integrative and collaborative modes of action. 
  It is in this civil domain that such traditional civic institutions as foundations, 
schools, churches, public-interest organizations and other voluntary associations properly 
belong. It is a space defined by such activities as attending church, mosque, or synagogue, 
  17doing community service, contributing to a charity, or being a member of a sports club. 
Voluntary associations serve as social spaces in which the members of the association 
reinforce their social webs and articulate their (moral) relationships. 
  To conceive of civil society as civic space where citizens rule themselves, we have 
to move beyond the two-celled, or 'binary' model of 'government versus private sector' and 
focus on the intermediate institutions in the civil space, in civil society. In fact we need a 
three celled-model in which civil society plays the intermediating role between government 
and the private sector. The civic space, this third arena, forms the glue between the 
individual and the state. 
  One of the prerequisites of viable civil society is that it is closely connected with the 
performance or sustainability of democratic institutions. For a viable civil society specific 
socio-cultural factors need also to be present. Civil associations reinforce the 'habits of the 
heart' that are essential to stable and effective democratic institutions. A vigorous civil 
society enhances not only the accountability, but also the representativeness and vitality of 
democracy. A flourishing oppositional society is the key to further democratization.
24 
Voluntary associations represent, for instance, a crucial institutional supplement to 
democratic political parties.
25 The performance of government and other social institutions 
is powerfully influenced by citizen engagement in community affairs.
26 
  A necessary condition for this performance is some level of social capital and 
public spiritedness. Without this democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable, 
and civil society cannot flourish. The concept of 'social capital' refers to features of social 
organization or social life - networks, norms, social trust - that enable participants to act 
together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. Social capital, in short, refers to 
  18social connections and the attendant norms and trust.
27 The theory of social capital 
presumes that, generally speaking, the more we connect with other people, the more we 
trust them, and vice versa. People who join are people who trust. In civic communities, 
individuals become citizens who will act with and trust others, even when they do not know 
them personally. Participation in voluntary associations such as clubs creates social capital 
in the form of dense networks of civic engagement that foster sturdy norms of generalized 
reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. (Putnam, 1995: 67). 
  The feelings of belonging are encouraged by participation in debate, as much within 
primary circles like the family, friends or the work group as within the framework of wider 
social movements or organizations, and even in forums of generalized communication. 
"Discussion about the common good may be the foundation of community, even when this 
communication expresses diversity of opinion (which is normally the case), if it tends to 
ratify everyone's interest in certain common themes and reinforce feelings of belonging to 
the same entity, at least under certain conditions." (Pérez-Díaz, 1998: 221). 
  To the extent that norms, networks and trust link substantial sectors of the 
community and span underlying social cleavages - to the extent that social capital is of a 
'bridging' sort - the enhanced cooperation is likely to serve broader interests and is to be 
widely welcomed. Social capital, then, is important for our relation with others, for the 
volatility of voluntary associations, for civil society and - eventually - for a democratic 
order. And an essential component of social capital is trust because trust lubricates 
cooperation. 
  Presently there is a growing fear that the public-spiritedness of citizens of liberal 
democracies may be in serious decline. That there is a loss of social capital and trust, and 
  19thus of civil society: that altruism is driven out by egoistic sources of action. The paradox of 
modern democratic society is that its cohesiveness can only be rooted in impersonal and 
generalized trust. But this very universalization of trust has, at the same time, undermined 
the concrete mutuality and shared components of the communality upon which trust must 
be based.
28 For those who claim there is in modern western democracies a lack of civil 
society, or a loss of it, the core problem is the way in which 'trust', by making it more 
'universal', has become at the same time more abstract and impersonal.  
  We stumble here on the conflicting characteristics of justice and solidarity. For 
instance, programs in welfare states that guarantee a decent standard of living, based on a 
conception of a fair and just society, can be interpreted as programs based on generalized 
solidarity. These programs work through impersonal networks. This generalization 
necessarily brings with it de-personification, and abstract classifications, and this creates its 
own contradiction, because the notion of community of need and solidarity implies 
solidarity with someone, with concrete, identifiable individuals.
29  
  This is clearly an illustration of the following general problem: The greater the 
number and diversity of persons in a group, the more that universalistic norms require 
altruism, and yet - at the same time - the weaker the force of altruism. We see here the 
antagonism of two crucial important concepts: 'face to face' trust versus  universal rights for 
'strangers'.
30 In western welfare states it is the very abstract and generalized nature of trust 
that militates against that solidarity upon which civil society must also stand.
31  
  The squaring of justice and solidarity, of private interest and public good, of shared 
citizenship identity and collective differences, of tolerance and cultural diversity, of 
multiculturalism and integration, remains the problem of civil society and of citizenship in 
  20the modern world. Where we cannot rely on familiarity and community, on 'face to face' 
relationships, an important step towards resolving this problem is the institutionalization of 
liberal democratic citizenship, with as its core the idea of shared political values. The 
substantive commitment implied in those values that lie at the heart of the institutional 
design of a liberal constitutional democratic order, can be the source of social capital by 
fostering sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity. Because it can be assumed that 
'everybody else' is similarly affected and inspired by the 'minimal moral conception' on 
which such a democratic order is based, the emergence of generalized trust among strangers 
can be encouraged, leading to social cooperation and social cohesion in a multicultural 
society.
32 Only in this way is there hope to generate a sense of community, strong enough 
that it, in turn, would provide the sense of solidarity necessary to secure the rights and 
duties of Marshallian citizenship. 
  In the following we will ask what the implications of the conception of liberal 
democratic citizenship developed above are, once we cross the boundaries of a nation-state, 
and step into a pan-national arena. 
 
European Citizenship 
When we discuss 'citizenship' across the borders of a nation-state, the concept of liberal 
democratic citizenship developed for a nation-state, should be extended. The question now 
becomes: What are, when we talk about a more universal concept of citizenship or - at least 
- when we give a political theoretical defence of a liberal democratic conception of 
citizenship for the 'European Union', the implications of the two constitutive aspects of 
citizenship, identity and rights, and of the institutions and practices of political cooperation? 
  21  The argument is twofold. In the first place there is no reason to think that across the 
boundaries of the nation-state the problem of cultural or ethnic pluralism will vanish. On the 
contrary one would say! The conception of citizenship that can cope with the problems 
raised by pluralism within a nation-state should also be applicable in a situation across 
borders where there is probably even more pluralism.  
  Second, the liberal democratic conception of citizenship defended here is 'liberal'. 
Liberal democratic citizenship is based on a minimal democratic criterion: the interests of 
each person are entitled to equal consideration. We may differ, but we are equally citizens, 
and it is as citizens that we advance claims in the political realm and assess the claims made 
by others. It is hard to imagine that arguments for equal concern and respect for persons 
defended within a nation-state, would vanish in any 'pan-national' conception of 
citizenship.
33 Thus, in a European context the minimal democratic criterion is still in place, 
including its democratic premiss of accountability. 
  What institutional structure, then, does the specified conception of citizenship 
require to be able to create 'shared citizenship identity', or to create 'constitutional 
patriotism' on a pan-national scale? Let us start with the assumption that 'federalism' will be 
the most adequate institutional form of government that fits the requirements of the liberal 
democratic conception of citizenship. What kind of political theoretical arguments, or 'good 
reasons' could be given to defend the choice of this form of government? Systematizing the 
normative principles of federalism, we use a social contract approach: such an approach is 
useful for helping us to organize our moral intuitions and draw consistent inferences about 
principles and institutions. It allows us to abstract from arrangements that are the result of 
bargaining processes in real-world negotiating with its defects "such as short-sighted 
  22political expediency, lack of empirical and historical knowledge, and unfair bargaining 
strength." (Norman, 1994: 84).  
  Several additional arguments for using a social contract approach when defending a 
federal structure, could be given. Remember that we have in a European context, as in the 
case of the nation-state, to deal with the problem of pluralism. Let us also remember that in 
the context of the nation-state we argued for using Rawls' contractarian approach. The 
public or institutional identity of citizens is contractually founded, eventually leading to the 
idea of a citizens having a 'double identity'. Let us add, broadening the scope to a European 
context, the following. Meehan has noted that through the construction of contractarianism,  
  "nationality and, hence, citizenship rights can be legally acquired through ius solis 
as in France and Italy. The second construction resembles the emphasis on 
nationality by descent, ius sanguinis, in Germany and the United Kingdom. If the 
modern association of citizenship with nationality rests on a legal or contractual 
view of communities, then it would not be too difficult to envisage a new form of it 
at the European level." (Meehan, 1993: 21-2). 
 
And we can note the same as we already did in the context of citizenship within a nation-
state: if citizenship is based on a communitarian or Gemeinschaft outlook, it would be much 
more difficult to envisage a new form of citizenship to develop at the European level. Good 
reasons, then, to use a contractarian approach. But there is still another reason to support 
this choice. Habermas has remarked that: 
  "In a future Federal Republic of European States, the same legal principles would 
also have to be interpreted from the vantage point of different national traditions and 
histories. One's own national tradition will, in each case, have to be appropriated in 
such a manner that it is related to and relativized by the vantage points of the other 
national cultures. It must be connected with the overlapping consensus of a 
common, supranationally shared political culture of the European Community. 
Particularist anchoring of this sort would in no way impair the universalist meaning 
of popular sovereignty and human rights." (Habermas, 1992: 7; my italics).   
 
We already used the idea of an overlapping consensus in the context of the nation-state, to 
  23be able to cope with reasonable pluralism. Arguing for a specific institutional form, 
federalism, this idea of an overlapping consensus is used once again, but now in a broader, 
European context.  
 
Federalism, Overlapping Consensus, and Democratic Authority 
In applying Rawls' contractarian approach for an argument for federalism we retain the key 
elements and motivations of his theory. Stability is not only a primary requirement for a 
well-functioning democratic nation-state, but also for a federation. And analogous to Rawls' 
three possible bases of political order within a nation-state, we suggest that there also could 
be three possible bases for types of federal commitment: one based on a 'modus vivendi', 
one based on a universal acceptance of some particular comprehensive moral doctrine, and 
one based on an 'overlapping consensus'.
34 The question is, once again, which would 
guarantee stability and social unity in a situation where we know that there are, not only 
within a nation-state, but also across the boundaries of nation-states, deeply dividing, 
conflicting conceptions of the good. 
  Let us assume that democratic states would not band (or remain) together in a 
federation if they did not perceive it to be to their mutual advantage. It does not follow, 
however, that federal relations are nothing more than a modus vivendi. In fact, for reasons 
parallel to those advanced by Rawls, it is reasonable to suppose that a federation based 
merely on a modus vivendi - one in which pan-federal identification, tolerance and 
solidarity do not develop - will remain inherently unstable: a partner that had for 
generations been a net beneficiary might defect the moment it felt called upon to be a net 
contributor.
35 At the same time, federations differ from unitary states because federal 
  24partners (and their citizens) did not want to relinquish all of their autonomy, sovereignty, 
and identity. This is already a reason to believe that federal partners do not have to or wish 
to accept a deep, monolithic conception of citizenship and identity as the basis of their 
union. We can go one step further, and say that they do not all have to share the same 
reasons for accepting the federal union and their citizens do not have to identify with the 
federal state in the same way or to the same extent. Norman argues that the most suitable 
basis for a just and stable federal union will thus be "some form of overlapping consensus 
that demands more of federal partners and their citizens than a modus vivendi, but less than 
a comprehensive, monolithic conception of shared identity and citizenship." (Norman, 
1994: 88). 
  Rawls' idea that members of liberal democracies have a double identity, is relevant 
here once again. In their personal or private capacity they have a non-institutional identity. 
But the public, or institutional identity, or their identity as a matter of basic law, may be 
broadened now to encompass being a member of a federation, if that federation is based on 
an overlapping consensus.   
  We can be more specific about this overlapping consensus based on principles that 
are to serve as a stable basis for cooperation between federal partners, given the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. Just as in the case of a specific constitutional democracy, the 
overlapping consensus in this case should work out substantive principles of justice, which 
apply to the federation as a whole. And it is, once again, not really important if these 
principles are the Rawlsian principles of justice, or other ones, as long as they formulate 
liberal ideas of justice, similar to but more general than 'justice as fairness'; principles in 
other words that form the traditional components of a welfare state, but that now apply to 
  25the federation as a whole - confronting the risks of sickness, old age, invalidity, 
unemployment, and poverty in all parts of the federation.  
  This overlapping consensus shared throughout a federation, should generate a 
shared citizenship identity that will supersede rival identities based on, in the first place, 
national identities. And in this case, where we discuss a federation it may be necessary, 
more so then in the case of a specific constitutional democracy, to take measures to 
encourage development of a moral commitment to the federation to prevent a 'fall back' into 
an unstable modus vivendi. This moral commitment would positively consist of developing 
a sense of solidarity and tolerance among the citizens of the new federation to encourage the 
emergence of a new pan-national, shared citizenship identity, a 'sense of community'.  
  Norman points to the flip-side of this argument for a development of solidarity and 
shared identity: "It may be more important to list factors that may have the potential to 
destabilize a pluralistic federation such as the perception of citizens of any sub-unit that it is 
unfairly disadvantaged, or that it is under-represented in key federal institutions, or that 
there is mutual distrust and a lack of mutual understanding." (ibid.: 91).  
  We have questioned the assumption that 'citizenship' necessarily adheres to the 
sovereign nation-state. The idea of an overlapping consensus in the context of a federal 
Europe, in conjunction with the idea of a 'double identity', leads us not only to the idea of 
'belonging' that comes with the concept of national identity, but also to 'belonging' that goes 
with a number of different levels of social organisation. Instead of the view that individuals 
have one basic political identity from which all the others are derivative, we might suppose 
that individuals can have multiple identities ranging from within the nation, like 
neighbourhood, town or city and region, to the nation itself, and on to social or political 
  26organisations that surpass the borders of the nation-state, like the European Union.   
  Each of these levels can provide opportunities for political cooperation, and in terms 
of the account of political identity that is advanced here, we are to think of political identity 
as based not upon a pre-existing social or cultural identity but instead as constituted by the 
existence of certain practices of political cooperation. If identity is constituted by 
participation in a common set of political institutions, there is no reason why identity cannot 
be fostered at the European level as much as at the level of the nation state or the region. 
(Indeed, off hand, there seems no reason why it could not be fostered on a even wider 
(global) level). Essential, then, is an account of political identity in which individuals may 
possess a complementary variety of identities depending upon their participation in a range 
of cooperative political practices. Of course the concerns expressed and attended to at these 
levels will be different, but they may certainly be complementary and perhaps even inter-
related (as when people are concerned about public transport in their city because they are 
worried about global climate change). To view political identity as constituted in the 
practice of political cooperation is, then, to allow for a variety of bonds of union. (Weale, 
1977: 138). 
  Just as in the case of citizenship within the context of a pluralistic, multi-cultural 
nation-state, it is the political culture that is shared and that, eventually, should lead to a 
shared citizenship identity. Once again, political allegiance is what counts, and 'a sense of 
community' should develop from that common denominator in which the constitutional 
principles are rooted. It would lead, to use Habermas's term, to 'constitutional patriotism' on 
a federal level.
36  
  The normative content of the concept of liberal democratic European citizenship 
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with increasing social and cultural pluralism but that the Union as a whole is as well. It 
means, of course, that all citizens do not share the same language or the same ethnic and 
cultural origins. On the contrary: they are aware that they are a part of multicultural 
societies. One could argue that the normative political theoretical argument in favour of this 
conception of citizenship in fact applies even more strongly at the level of the European 
political order. A European demos cannot be based on exclusive ethno-cultural terms, on an 
idea of ethnic homogeneity.
37 On the contrary, the collectivity of citizens that constitute the 
demos encompasses heterogeneity. To be sure: once again cultural and ethnic pluralism is 
not denied. What is denied is that ethno-cultural characteristics should play a role when 
developing a 'sense of community' on a European level. On a pan-national, European level 
the concept of liberal democratic citizenship also parts company with identity based on 
ethnos. Liberal democratic citizenship is, in fact, a plea for solidarity and tolerance among 
the citizens of the European Union. 
 
European Citizenship and Imagined Boundaries 
In line with questioning the assumption that 'citizenship' necessarily adheres to the 
sovereign nation-state, Linda Bishai has argued that it is something of a paradox that the 
evolution of the modern political state has yielded a system in which legitimacy derives 
from sovereign control over bounded territory, yet the citizens who reside within a state 
territory may feel multiple forms of allegiance which not only transcend cartography, but 
which shift in response to events both internal and external to the state.
38 The 'people' who 
confer legitimacy on the state may be defined as those who live within the fixed territorial 
  28boundaries of the state. But making those 'people' fit the meaning of 'nation', ensuring that 
they feel both civic and cultural loyalty to each other as co-citizens is, according to Bishai, 
an endlessly fruitless task which problematises the concept of 'nation-state' and, we should 
add, citizenship. 
  Modern individuals are embedded in interrelated and changeable identity 
possibilities; and regardless of which definition of nation is operative, individuals may 
identify with or feel sympathy for a number of various identities either simultaneously or 
consecutively. Walker puts it thus: "Modern political identities are fractured and dispersed 
among a multiplicity of sites, a condition sometimes attributed to a specifically post-modern 
experience but one that has been a familiar, though selectively forgotten, characteristic of 
modern political life for several centuries."
39 In contrast, the international political system is 
based upon a presumption that identities are fixed arbitrarily and externally by territory and 
residence, thus limiting national identities by a concept of the state which apparently defines 
the outer limits of political possibility.  
  A major element in our argument on shared citizenship identity has been, however, 
that 'national' identities are far too non-territorial to be confined to the fixed boundaries of 
the state. In this regard Onora O'Neill has noted that the "concepts by which people define 
who they are - in which they articulate their sense of identity - are all of them concepts 
without sharp borders, and hence cannot provide a basis for sharp demarcations such as 
political boundaries between states." (O'Neill, 1994: 78).  
  Be this as it may, as the defining characteristic of statehood, sovereignty has 
become the focal point of the nation/state identity nexus. And as long as national identity 
and territory are linked by means of the concept of (national) sovereignty, this definition is 
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link can only be sustained if the concept of sovereignty remains territorial. Paradoxically, 
neither states, nations nor sovereignty are fixed structural entities. The boundaries of the 
nation, then, are limited only by the collective imaginations of its members. 
  These arguments seem to underwrite our supposition that individuals can have 
multiple identities, ranging from the neighbourhood through the city and region, to the 
nation-state and the European Union, and perhaps even to a global level. We may also be 
correct in supposing that shared citizenship identity can on all these levels be fostered by 
participation in a common set of political institutions. It goes, however, without saying that 
the institutional requirements for shared citizenship identity, such as a democratic process 
with accountability, complicates matters profoundly.
40  
 
European Citizenship, Justice and Solidarity 
We have argued that liberal democratic citizenship is based on a minimal democratic 
criterion: the interests of each person are entitled to equal consideration. And we noted that 
it would be hard to imagine that arguments for equal concern and respect for persons 
defended within a nation-state, would vanish in any 'pan-national' conception of citizenship. 
  The commitment to equal concern and respect may require - just as on the national 
level - a re-distributive pan-European welfare state. Thus, both constitutive elements of the 
Marshallian conception of citizenship, identity and rights, have to look 'forward', to 
'Europe', and not 'backward' to the nation, as the collective identity determining object, and 
to the moral equality of all members of that Union: all citizens of the Union are morally 
equidistant. 
  30  However, and not withstanding the argument just given that 'national' identities are 
far too non-territorial to be confined to the fixed boundaries of the state, it could be argued 
that arguments that defend equal concern and respect for persons within the boundaries of a 
nation-state, cannot be stretched beyond the border of that state. Individuals may have 
multiple identities, and shared citizenship identity may be fostered by participation in a 
common set of political institutions on a European level, but the question remains if this 
does generate a sense of solidarity that is strong enough to secure Marshallian (social) rights 
and duties of European citizenship. 
  Nationalism insists, for instance, that "conationals should have greater concern for 
one another than for others and should, other things being equal, give priority to one 
another's interests over the interests of others. And this is at least prima facie incompatible 
with the idea that all persons are entitled to equal concern and respect or that no one's 
interests count more than the equivalent interests of another." (McMahan, 1997: 109). It 
may imply, for instance, that re-distributive policies within the EU as a whole, may not be 
able to call upon similar solidarity as they do within nation-states (if they do this there at 
all). The claim here is that the basic rights of citizenship presupposes - and would be 
impossible to secure in the absence of - a thicker shared culture, perhaps even a myth of 
ethnic unity, than the thin conception of European citizenship is able to provide.  
  Miller, for instance, argues that "the duties we owe to our fellow-nationals are 
different from, and more extensive than, the duties we owe to human beings as such" and 
thus that "there is no objection in principle to institutional schemes -such as welfare states- 
that are designed to deliver benefits exclusively to those who fall within the same 
boundaries as ourselves." (Miller, 1995b: 11) This argument is based on the assumption that 
  31only 'communal solidarity' creates the requisite political willingness to redistribute, because 
the welfare state is "the setting in which ideas of social justice can be pursued." (Miller, 
1995b: 185).
41  
  But do we, indeed, owe more to our fellow countrymen and less to foreigners? The 
discussion of Goodin (1988) may be helpful here. His approach to special duties with 
regard to compatriots, is to regard these duties as being merely 'distributed general duties', 
resulting in a 'assigned responsibility model'. Special duties are, in other words, derivative 
from general duties. These general duties are pursued more effectively if they are 
subdivided and particular people are assigned special responsibilities for particular portions 
of the task. Thus, special responsibilities are assigned merely as an administrative device for 
discharging our general duties more efficiently. The presumption here is that everyone has 
been assigned an advocate/protector.    
  National boundaries can be interpreted as performing this function of subdivision of 
tasks. "The duties that the states (or, more precisely, their officials) have vis-à-vis their own 
citizens are not in any deep sense special. At root, they are merely the general duties that 
everyone has towards everyone else worldwide." (Goodin, 1988: 681). It is nation-states 
that are assigned special responsibility for protecting and promoting the interests of those 
who are their citizens: states have been assigned responsibility for compatriots, in a way 
that they have not been assigned any responsibility for foreigners and these special state 
responsibilities are derived from general ones of everyone to everyone. Goodin's conclusion 
is that:  
  "Boundaries matter. (...) But it is boundaries around people, not boundaries around 
territories, that really matter morally. Territorial boundaries are merely useful 
devices for 'matching' one person to one protector. Citizenship is merely a device 
  32for fixing special responsibility in some agent for discharging our general duties vis-
à-vis each particular person. At root, however, it is the person and the general duty 
that we all have toward him that matters morally." (Goodin, 1988: 686).    
 
If, indeed, this argument is plausible, and if what matters are boundaries around people, and 
not around territories, and if the purpose of these boundaries is to discharge our general 
duties more efficiently, this 'assigned responsibility model' could be applied as well to the 
European Union as a whole.  
  It is neither normatively, nor empirically too far fetched to see the Union as an 
advocate/protector of its member citizens; the Union is assigned special responsibility for 
protecting and promoting the interests of those who are its citizens. The boundary of the 
Union is a way of discharging our general duties better, for instance, by promoting peace 
and tranquillity, by its economic policy in a broad sense (fiscal policy, monetary policy, 
competition policy, social policy, regional policy and industrial policy), by its foreign and 
security policies, and by its policies concerning justice and home affairs. Why not, then, 
extend this protection to guaranteeing Marshallian social rights to all European citizens? 
  Goodin argues that boundaries should be drawn and - if necessary - be redrawn, if 
some states prove incapable of discharging their responsibilities effectively. They, then, 
should either be reconstituted or assisted. We should add: the boundaries of the Union are 
more or less permanently redrawn: enlargement follows upon enlargement, membership 
grows. The boundaries of the Union seem, then, to be limited only by the collective 
imaginations of its members. 
  But even if this argument of assigned special responsibility for all those who are 
citizens within the boundaries of the Union holds, the question still remains if this 
responsibility would generate enough solidarity for the citizens of the Union as a whole, 
  33among citizens of the member states to support, for instance, a pan-national re-distribution 
policy. One could wonder how this pan-national solidarity could be generated, if - as we 
have discussed earlier - we take into account that re-distributive solidarity already seems to 
be crumbling within national welfare states.  
  I suggest that the idea of 'civil society' can help us - once again - to generate a sense 
of community that is necessary to secure the rights and duties of membership. But now we 
are in need of a European civil society to do so.  
  Earlier on, in the context of citizenship within a nation state, we discussed the 
problem of the squaring of justice and solidarity on a national level, a problem that remains 
the problem of civil society and of citizenship. We noted that the greater the number and 
diversity of persons in a group, the more that universalistic norms require altruism, and yet - 
at the same time - the weaker the force of altruism. We noted also the antagonism of two 
crucial important concepts: 'face to face' trust versus universal rights for 'strangers'. This 
antagonism holds of course even more so, when the argument is extended to a pan-national 
scale. We also noted that, because it can be assumed that 'everybody else' is similarly 
affected and inspired by the 'minimal moral conception' on which a liberal democratic order 
is based, the emergence of generalized trust among strangers can be encouraged, leading to 
social cooperation and social cohesion in a multicultural society.  
  If this argument about the pivotal role civil society plays to encourage the 
emergence of generalized trust among strangers holds on the national level, this role of civil 
society should be extended to the European level. It would imply a public sphere where 
there is a "continuous, ongoing, unending civic conversation involving a 'critical mass' of 
concerned European citizens in regard to matters of institutional design, policy and 
  34collective identity", for building whatever European political construction may be possible. 
"A public space or public sphere is a crucial building block of that construction, and the 
counterpart for a common public authority, in the larger framework of a European civil 
society that would allow for a lively internal pluralism." (Pérez-Díaz, 1998: 219). What is 
needed is a European-wide, integrated public sphere: a civil society with interest 
associations; non-governmental organizations; citizens' movements; and a party system 
appropriate to a European arena.
42 This could stimulate a European civic conversation that 
would lead to the accumulation of political and social capital, necessary for a European civil 
society. 
 
European Citizenship in the European Union 
We noted at the outset that 'citizenship' is an essential contested concept. The argument so 
far has been an exercise in political theory to clarify the meaning of liberal democratic 
citizenship and the related idea of shared citizenship identity. The description of the 
requirements of a liberal democratic conception of citizenship gives us, in the context of the 
European Union, criteria to judge to what extent 'citizenship' is in fact realized. 
  Needless to say that the meaning of 'citizenship' is also hotly contested in real life 
politics. In political debates within and between the political actors of the nation-states of 
the European Union the issue of citizenship is not vigorously contested when this debate 
turns around a conception of individuals as citizens of states which are themselves members 
of the European Union. "In fact, the term 'European citizenship' is perceived as though it 
were a condition by which people from different nations should have similar rights to be 
asserted vis-à-vis the European public courts and public officials." (Pérez-Díaz, 1998: 235). 
  35  What is, however, more vigorously contested is a conception of individuals as 
immediate bearers of EU citizenship, "a condition by which those different peoples should 
share a common destiny and a common burden (or duty) of civic responsibility, together 
with pride, memories, and the excitement and anticipation of future common endeavour. 
Far from being the cornerstone of a civic religion, European citizenship is seen as a vehicle 
for furthering private claims (to be put before the public authorities)." (ibid.: 235).  
  The fact that the discussion turns on a conception of individuals as citizens of states, 
which are themselves members of the EU is, in itself, not surprising. It is very doubtful if 
the creation of European citizenship has been a conscious goal of the actors in the EU. 
Streeck, for instance, notes that  
  "the uniqueness and, indeed, the genius of Monnet's design, ... lay exactly in its 
uncoupling of progress on supranational organization from progress in the 
formation of supranational patriotism. The European Community was conceived as 
a political regime that would have to, and could, survive and grow without the 
popular legitimacy that previous modes of state building had required. In Monnet's 
pragmatic approach, European unity was to be based for the foreseeable future not 
on collective acceptance of a common identity but on the functional 
interdependence of political-administrative decisions and organized interests in an 
internationalized 'mixed' economy." (Streeck, 1995a: 412; my italics). 
 
We can add that it seems fair to say that the founding of a United Europe depended mainly 
if not totally on the 'four freedoms' that are important for economic integration: the free 
movement of persons, goods, capital and services. At the fore has been 'economic 
citizenship'.  
  And today, listening to national politicians talking about the 'new' Europe, we can 
note that this still is the case. If there is talk at all about 'European citizenship', EU actors are 
divided over that goal. In fact there is an absence of a significant measure of EU citizenship 
to the extent that a strong EU citizenship, and a correspondingly diminished or qualified 
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  The fact that political as well as social citizenship have, until now, only been 
marginal in the process of European unification has led Leibfried to note that: 
  "Unity in such a restrictive frame would turn into a unity of 'possessive 
individualism', a unity of markets only. It will not be the unity of an enlightened 
'Social Europe' synthesising its traditions of democracy and solidarity, of civil and 
social rights, and building on its traditions of merging the citizen and the social 
state". (Leibfried, 1993: 150). 
 
The concept of 'Union Citizenship', as formulated in the Maastricht Treaty, has not changed 
the direction the Union has been taking since its founding. Steps taken towards European 
citizenship at Maastricht in 1991, have not allowed for "the metamorphosis of the 'market 
citizen' (1957-91) into the 'full-fledged' EU citizen - a new synthesis which includes a 
European welfare state trajectory, building on universal rights." (Leibfried, 1993: 150-1). 
And Streeck has noted that, three years after Maastricht, there was little doubt that the battle 
for an EU social policy had been lost once more. The Social Charter, for instance, was 
adopted only as a non-binding 'social declaration' of the European Council, and "references 
to citizens were replaced with references to workers to avoid the appearance of an expanded 
social policy mandate for the Community." (Streeck, 1995: 402-3). Integration is once again 
identified with deregulation and political disengagement from the economy, and the 
intergovernmental character of the community was confirmed by the Single European Act. 
"A free European market, if this is all that is to be, does not 'require' a 'Europe of the 
citizen'; in fact, citizenship makes the market less 'free'." (ibid.: 413).  
  The conclusion has to be that 'Maastricht' has not brought the actual situation in the 
European Union more in line with a conception of liberal democratic European citizenship 
as sketched above. If we refer once again to the ideas of Marshall on citizenship, and want 
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to accept, as Streeck remarks, the development of the Union "into a 'Europe for the citizen' - 
social policy and all - or else the integration project will die from lack of popular support." 
(ibid.: 408-9). And we should add that, if central re-distributive measure are indeed required 
for a just Europe, the accomplishment of economic citizenship, the four freedoms, is 
certainly not enough to embody an idea of social justice: every citizen of the EU is to enjoy 
as a citizen of the EU, entitlements which stand apart from and to some extent conflict with 
the outcomes of a market driven by considerations of efficiency. 
  But how realistic is it to envision a European welfare state, a 'transnational 
synthesis' of national welfare states, with 'European social citizenship' being one backbone 
of the 'United States of Europe'? Would it be a realistic hope to think that we could 
eventually realize a 'pan-European welfare state'? 
  Pierson and Leibfried argue that, although actual and potential European social 
policy is of considerable significance, "[s]ocial policy has in fact taken a backseat to the 
single-market project; hopes (or fears) of some pan-European welfare state can be put to 
rest." (Pierson and Leibfried, 1995: 4). And Leibfried has noted that the EU social policy 
mandate is mostly focused on employees and their families and not on the European citizen 
per se. And this goes for the EU Social Charter as well. His conclusion is that "the 
evolution of 'pre-federal' European institutions, of Europe's 'incomplete federalism', has 
been strongly moulded by 'negative integration'." (Leibfried, 1993: 134).  
  An empirical requirement for 'European citizenship' or a 'Social Europe' to come 
about should be then, or so it seems, a 'positive mode of integration': an integration that is 
much more ambitious and complete than a pure and simple common market goal, one that 
  38only removes obstacles, and is concerned with national deregulation. It should aim at 
constructive action, at a 'positive state', i.e. market corrections, a movement from 'freedom' 
to 'social rights' in a unifying Europe. (ibid.: 134). 
  But is a 'positive integration' conceivable as a by-product of on-going European 
economic integration? Could a 'Social Europe' eventually emerge from the different existing 
welfare systems in Europe? Here Leibfried's conclusion is, just like that of Streeck, 
negative. The "divergence of [welfare state] regimes does not lend support to the notion that 
a European welfare state might grow via automatic harmonisation, building from the 
national towards the EU level. A 'bottom up' strategy for EU 'social integration' policy 
seems stillborn." (ibid.: 143). 
  Leibfried is of the opinion that European development will most likely leave all 
poverty and welfare policy at the local or state level - at the sub-European level -, one of the 
main reasons being that it is hard to start from a common European denominator. In fact, 
the "easy common ground is missing on which a European welfare regime could be built." 
(ibid.: 143).
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 Recapitulating,  we  can conclude that, if a Marshallian conception of citizenship is to 
be envisioned on a European level, one necessary requirement is positive integration. And 
positive integration implies solidarity, or 'social rights' on an European-level. This requires, 
in turn, at least shared European citizenship identity. This is, of course, not surprising 
because the two constitutive elements of 'European citizenship', rights and identity, are 
closely intertwined: shared European identity is a necessary precondition to generate some 
sense of solidarity to stimulate positive integration.
44 However, the 
  "critical problem is that the Europeans do not consider the EU sufficiently 
  39legitimate, democratically speaking, for it to be possible to achieve, in the area of 
positive integration, a degree of superstatism comparable to that already established 
in the area of negative integration." (Gustavsson, 1997: 114). 
 
And thus we have come full circle: what is necessary is the implementation of liberal 
democratic European citizenship, that will help developing shared European citizenship 
identity. The question remains, of course, what empirical impediments are hindering 
development in this direction? 
 
European Citizenship: its empirical setting 
When we discuss the empirical setting in which the normative concept of shared citizenship 
identity should be realized on a pan-national, European level, it is necessary, more so then 
when we discuss the concept in the context of a nation-state, to make a distinction between 
objective and subjective citizenship:  
(a) objective citizenship is the extent to which the rights extended to individuals within the 
EU by the EU amount to the creation of an EU 'citizenship', and the extent to which the 
necessary political institutions, which make participation in a common set of political 
institutions possible, have been institutionalized;  
(b) subjective citizenship is the extent to which individuals actually conceive themselves as 
'citizens' of the EU and have a sense of 'belonging' to that supranational Union.  
  The gist of the idea of shared citizenship identity, as developed here, is that 
objective and subjective citizenship are related: the establishment of a greater measure of 
objective citizenship, may foster a stronger subjective citizenship. The public or 
institutional identity as an expression of one's membership in a political community, is thus 
not only constituted by the existence of certain institutions but also by practices of political 
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  But although objective and subjective citizenship are related, they are not the same 
and the explanation for their progress, or lack of it, may be different. In this regard the 
following should be noted. The concept of liberal democratic citizenship according to 
which individuals are identified as citizens of a state (or Union) by way of their subjection 
to, or allegiance to, a common set of liberal democratic institutions as defended here, does 
not pretend to describe the reality of citizens in actual liberal democratic states. It has, in 
fact, been contrasted with a notion of citizenship that seems to be more in line with 
empirical reality, one based on 'ethnos' or descent (or 'national' identity). We are of course 
well aware that in actual liberal democratic states, such as Britain, France, Germany, or The 
Netherlands, people's sense of citizenship - their sense of 'belonging', of being 'members' of 
a particular state - (still) depends upon more than just living under a common set of political 
institutions. Its sense of 'belonging' relates to the sense of a shared history, a shared culture, 
a shared language, perhaps even some sense of shared descent, even a shared ethnos (in 
spite of ethnic plurality, there is often a strong sense that the majority society constitutes an 
indigenous 'host' community).  
  We noted earlier on that if citizenship is based on a communitarian or Gemeinschaft 
outlook, based on ethnos, or ius sanguinis, it would be difficult to envisage the development 
of a new form of citizenship at the European level. And the fact that the normative content 
of the concept of liberal democratic citizenship is dissociated from national identity based 
on 'ethnos', means of course that a European demos cannot - normatively speaking - be 
based on ethno-cultural terms, and should also never become one (leaving aside the 
improbable situation that this would ever empirically come about). 
  41  But more is needed than the uncoupling of ethnos and demos. If we want to develop 
shared European citizenship identity that can generate solidarity, "a shift from demoi-cracy 
to  demos-cracy, a shift from accountability to the separate peoples of Europe ... to 
accountability to the people of Europe as a whole", is required. (Van Parijs, 1998: 298-9). 
Taking, however, the empirical situation of the European Union into account, we have to 
conclude that 'European citizenship' is not based on a European 'demos', but still consists of 
'demoi'. Our conclusion here is that, as long as a European 'demos' is non-existent, the idea 
of 'belonging' to a European Union as one of citizens's possible identities and, thus, the hope 
for European citizenship, is very dim indeed.
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  In addition it should be mentioned that the European situation only partly 
corresponds to the ideal type of a 'civil society', as discussed above. What is missing is a 
sphere of European-wide free public debate. "The contents of domestic debates suggest the 
crucial importance of two topics: that of the relation between the public authority and the 
citizens, and that of socioeconomic policy. There cannot be a vigorous European public 
sphere unless these topics become a central part of the European debate and political 
process." (Pérez-Díaz, 1998: 222). There is, in other words, no European networked civil 
society. Opinion- and will-formation processes are still national organized. 
 The  implications  of  these empirical factors, are at least twofold: (a) Citizenship may 
in actual liberal democratic states be created and sustained by factors other than only 
political institutions, and participating in that common political culture; (b) If these factors 
are ignored, any comparison of people's sense of belonging to a nation-state with their sense 
of being citizens of the EU will be vitiated. To expect a strong sense of EU citizenship to 
arise  only from people's subjection to a common set of political institutions would 
  42empirically expect more than any nation-state has probably ever achieved. This holds even 
more strongly when the relevance of non-liberal democratic aspects (ethnos!) of people's 
sense of citizenship in contemporary European states is ignored. By ignoring these factors 
one may overlook one of the most important impediments to the development of a sense of 
pan-national European citizenship. Even if the day comes when 'objective' EU citizenship is 
as great as it is in nation-states, 'subjective' EU citizenship may still lag behind.   
  Speaking about the present EU, it should be added that it is not only the case that 
people fail to perceive that the existing institutional structure of the EU does provide some 
sort of basis for objective liberal democratic citizenship, but that as a matter of fact the 
institutional structures of the EU themselves don't provide a set of rights and roles which 
amount to anything that can be identified as European liberal democratic citizenship. There 
is a large discrepancy between the requirements of the institutional design necessary to 
realize any form of European shared citizenship identity, such as institutions that guarantee 
accountability to the citizens of the Union, and the actual reality of the Union.
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  It should, however, also be noted that promoting implementation of the objective 
conditions necessary for Union citizenship, may have the unintended consequence of 
strengthening national senses of community, of 'belonging' to a specific nation-state, and 
thus strengthening the impediments for achieving subjective citizenship on a pan-national 
scale. Promoting 'bringing together', may create a growing problem of 'holding together'.
47 I 
suggest that the 'Amsterdam Treaty' of June 1997 exemplifies this. It shows that we seem to 
have reached the frontier of the integrative project, if we interpret this project as creating 
liberal democratic citizenship identity on the level of the Union. It shows that the reigning 
integration project is certainly not a federalist one. The Amsterdam Treaty is, once again, a 
  43clear example of what the real priorities of the Union are: economic integration. 
 
Now if this is, indeed, all true, one could wonder why we should bother at all that the 
requirements to be able to speak of European liberal democratic citizenship, are not met. 
There are at least two arguments why we should, in fact, be concerned about this.  
  In the first place, broad empirical study into political values, attitudes, and 
behaviour in all member states of the European Union conclude that, regardless of other 
socio-cultural differences, peoples of the European Union in politicis hardly are 
distinguishable.
48 There is, I suggest, in fact an overlapping consensus between citizens of 
the European Union, an overlapping consensus on democratic constitutional principles that 
are rooted in the shared political culture across borders of the nation-states that make up the 
European Union, and serve as a common denominator. So, let us not to quickly assume that 
peoples are not interested in a federal Europe that would be able to close the gap of the 
democratic deficit, and that they are not interested in accomplishing more integration.  
  The question is in how far political identities, political languages, political cultures 
are, in fact, different. The suggestion is that they are not: in fact, peoples in the European 
Union de facto live in rather identical political cultures, react the same way on political 
stimuli, use the same political language.   
  Secondly, Pierson and Leibfried, who have done detailed research on the state of the 
European Union, conclude their research as following: "What is emerging in Europe is a 
multi-levelled, highly fragmented system in which policy 'develops' but is beyond the firm 
control of any single authority." (Pierson and Leibfried, 1995: 433; my italics). If it is 
indeed the case that the European Union is developing 'beyond the firm control of any 
  44single authority', one could conclude that it does not make sense at all to speak about 
'accountability', or about 'the democratic content' of this Union. We have to surmise that we 
don't even know where 'the locus of authority' is. 
  However, if the normative political theoretical argument that accountability is 
normally essential to the exercise of political authority, that whenever there are political 
institutions making authoritative decisions for a population, those institutions should be 
accountable to the population, the discrepancy between the reality of the Union and these 
normative ideas should be something to worry about. In fact I suggest that if the perception 
of citizens of any sub-unit is that it is unfairly disadvantaged or that it is under-represented 
in key supra-national institutions, if there is a lack of mutual understanding, or even mutual 
distrust, these may be factors that have the potential to destabilize a union. It is reasonable 
to suppose that a union based merely on a modus vivendi - one in which pan-national 
identification, tolerance and solidarity do not develop - will remain inherently unstable.
49  
  The conclusion to be drawn is that consensus around a liberal democratic 
conception of citizenship seems to be the only viable basis for a stable social union in, and 
between modern democratic societies that are characterized by the fact of cultural and 
ethnic pluralism. After all we should realize that Europe is not only the Europe of 
Auschwitz, but also of Srebrenica. Therefore I suggest that 'the gradual encroachment of 
these ideas' on liberal democratic citizenship should be stimulated. It seems the only way to 
go forward to a united, democratic Europe.
50  
  45Notes 
 
  
1. See also Schmitter (1998). 
 
2. See for an extensive political theoretical discussion of the meaning and implications of 
'European citizenship': Lehning and Weale (1997). 
 
3. See also Beiner (1995: 19). 
 
4. See also Barbalet: "In the modern democratic state the basis of citizenship is the 
capacity to participate in the exercise of political power through the electoral process". 
(Barbalet, 1988: 2). 
 
5. See Marshall (1964: 78). 
 
6. See also: King and Waldron (1988: 423). 
 
7. We are not so much interested in our present discussion in the correctness of 
Marshall's empirical claim about the evolutionary sequence of rights, and that this 
sequence has a universal pattern. Of course in England he sees the evolution as having 
taken hold in three successive centuries. 
 
8. See for an overview: Mulhall and Swift (1992). See also Taylor (1989). 
 
9. See for this distinction also: Beiner (1995: 13-4). 
 
10. See David Miller for another distinction of conceptions of citizenship. He labels them 
"liberal, libertarian and republican". The main lines of the liberal conception "can be 
seen in the classic statement by T. H. Marshall. Citizenship should be understood as a set 
of rights enjoyed equally by every member of the society in question". (1995a, 435). 
Miller includes Rawls' theory in this liberal conception. An example of the libertarian 
conception of citizenship is to be found in Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), 
according to Miller. The third conception, is a republican conception of citizenship and is 
the one Miller himself underwrites. 
 
11. See Kymlicka, 1989, esp. chapter 9. 
 
12. See on this patriotism without nationalism, and the distinction between (political) 
patriotism, which means democratic citizenship and the language of nationalism, which 
is employed to call for cultural, ethnic, or religious homogeneity, also Viroli. The 
patriotism of liberty does not need social, or cultural, or religious, or ethnic 
homogeneity: "to see the right sort of patriotism grow, we need not strengthen 
homogeneity and oneness but work to strengthen the practice and the culture of 
citizenship." (Viroli, 1997: 184). 
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13. But see the caution formulated by Yack, discussing the ethnic-civic dichotomy, as if 
individuals can in fact choose their civic identity: "It may be reasonable to contrast 
nations whose distinctive cultural inheritance centres on political symbols and political 
stories with nations whose cultural inheritance centres on language and stories about 
ethnic origin. But it is unreasonable and unrealistic to interpret this contrast as a 
distinction between the rational attachment to principle and the emotional celebration of 
inherited culture. ... [O]ne must pretend that it makes sense to characterize nations such 
as France, Canada, and the United States as voluntary associations for the expression of 
shared political principles." (Yack, 1996: 197). In short: the myth of the civic nation, in 
contrast with the ethnic nation, suggests that your national identity is nothing but your 
choice. But, to summarize Yack's argument, this merely is wishful thinking. 
 
14. The importance of this principle in liberal theory is recognized by many different 
theorists. See: Larmore (1987), Rawls (1996), Sandel (1982). 
 
15. See especially the publications of Rawls after 1985, culminating in his Political 
Liberalism (1996). 
 
16. See also Hill (1993: 73). 
 
17. Miller's critique of this liberal conception of citizenship is, that it can not deal with 
pluralism, in contrast with his own republican conception of citizenship. (Miller, 1995a: 
443). I have to admit that I can't follow his argumentation with regard to this point. See 
also note 10. 
 
18. The political conception of justice Rawls has in mind is of course his own 
conception:  justice as fairness. It is intended to solve the fundamental question of 
political justice, namely, what the most appropriate conception of justice is for 
specifying the terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal 
persons. (Rawls, 1971; 1985: 234; 1987: 7; 1996). 
 
19. Here I discuss only what is called 'teleological communitarianism' as formulated by, 
for instance, Sandel and MacIntyre. I do not elaborate on non-teleological com-
munitarian ideas as formulated by, for instance, Taylor (1989; 1992). 
 
20. See also Larmore (1987: 119) for stressing the importance of 'belonging'. Sandel's 
suggestion for a politics of the common good is to be found in Sandel (1984: 17). In 
(1996) he is still of the same opinion. 
 
21.. See also Seligman (1992: 205); (1993: 158-9). 
 
22. Bryant (1993: 396); Shills (1991: 3); Seligman (1992: 5-6). 
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23. See for these and the following remarks on the idea of civil society especially: Barber 
(1996a); (1996b: 277-92); (1998). 
 
24. 'Oppositional' is not, of course, the same as 'adversary'. 'Oppositional' voluntary 
associations share the framework of the liberal democratic society. 'Adversary' voluntary 
associations do not. See on the problem of freedom of association also the essays in 
Gutmann (1998).  
 
25. Diamond (1993). 
 
26. See Putnam (1993). 
 
27. We follow with this description Putnam (1993). Putnam, on his turn, basis the 
concept of 'social capital' on Coleman (1988). 
 
28. Seligman (1992: 194). 
 
29. See Benhabib (1986: 340-3). 
 
30. One also could interpret this as the antagonism of communitarian political theorizing 
versus the theory of political liberalism. See for a recent communitarian perspective on 
these problems: Etzioni (1996). 
 
31. Seligman (1992: 196). 
 
32. See for an extensive argument: Lehning (1988c).  
 
33. But see, for instance, Miller (1995b). See also the debate triggered by Martha 
Nussbaum's essay 'Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism' in Nussbaum, et.al. (1996). 
 
34. This idea of adapting and applying Rawls' idea of an overlapping consensus to the 
problem of federalism is recommend by Norman (1994). It should be pointed out that 
Rawls himself does not apply this idea to federalism. He does, however, apply his social 
contract theory to the 'law of peoples', that is to say, he asks how the law of peoples may 
be developed out of liberal ideas of justice similar to but more general than the idea of 
'justice as fairness'. He is especially interested in the principles and norms of 
international law and practice. See Rawls (1993). 
 
35. See also Rawls' explanation for rejecting the 'modus vivendi' perspective when it is 
characterized as a treaty between two states whose national aims and interests put them 
at odds. (Rawls, 1996: 147). 
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36. See also Habermas (1996). Compare also the arguments offered by Weale (1997). 
See however Barber for a critical note on federalism as a solution for integration and 
democracy on a global, or even European scale, and why confederalism may offer a 
more promising strategy and viable alternative, especially in a situation where the 
international sovereign is the very entity that is missing. Barber (1996b: 288-90). 
 
37. In this regard the so-called Maastricht decision of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court should be considered carefully. It has a 'No-Demos' thesis, and argues in fact that 
the emergence of a pre-exiting European Demos defined in ethno-cultural terms is a 
precondition for constitutional unification or, more minimally, for a redrawing of 
political boundaries. See for several objections to this Demos-as-Volk thesis: Weiler, et 
al. (1995: 9-24); Weiler (1997). See also Habermas on the 'tragic irony' of the argument 
of the Court that extension of the Union requires certain cultural homogeneity among its 
people. (Habermas, 1996: 137). 
 
38. See for these and following remarks: Bishai (1988). 
 
39. See Walker (1991). 
 
40. Although it seems there are no political theoretical arguments that preclude the 
application of the concept of 'citizenship' and 'identity' beyond borders of nation-states 
on to the European Union, it goes without saying that an even wider extension, on a 
more cosmopolitan scale, even global level, would make it more difficult to realize the 
institutional requirements that are necessary for such an extension. 
 
41. See for a critical discussion of this specific communitarian position also Friedman, 
(1996). 
 
42. See also Habermas (1997: 263). 
 
43. The fact that this common ground is missing and that trying to harmonize, for 
instance, social insurance systems to any significant extent looks like a hopeless task is, 
of course, one of the reasons Van Parijs argues for a 'Eurogrant', a basic income at a 
comparatively low level. See: Van Parijs (1997). 
 
44. See also Streeck who argues that the coming about of European-level social policy 
must suggest that European unity must be grounded in some form of popular European 
identity and he adds that this identity, requires in turn "a policy of redistributive justice 
based on an advanced version of common European citizenship." (Streeck, 1995: 408). 
 
45. Someone who does not share this argument in favor of a European demos is, for 
instance, Weiler. He agrees that there is no European demos, but he adds "that there 
should not be one". (Weiler, 1997: 117). His remark is based on the idea that 'demos', as 
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used by him, implies "creating one people out of many". Contrary to that idea, he 
defends the idea of a 'union among peoples' which "is, in part, about creating a political 
culture which learns new ways to deal with the other" (ibid.: 118). It is an invitation for 
individuals to see themselves as belonging simultaneously to two demoi, based on 
different subjective factors of identification. As far as the European demos is concerned, 
it is based on European transnational affinities to shared values which transcend the 
ethno-national diversity.  
From the argument developed in the text, it should be clear that I could well agree with 
this understanding of European membership, based on civic and political rather than 
ethno-cultural terms. It should be noted, however, that according to Weiler, the 
determining factor of identification of the national, as a national, is based on the reaching 
strong sense of organic-cultural identification. This conception of a demos on a national 
scale is, of course, in flat contradiction with the conception argued for by me. Starting on 
the level of the nation-state, ethnos and demos are already uncoupled: we argued that on 
a national scale demos, as a regulating principle of inclusion, is based on a shared 
political culture. The underlying argument makes it of course also more plausible that 
shared citizenship identity can be extended to a pan-national scale. In Weiler's argument 
the in-reaching and out-reaching identification are based on different factors. This makes 
it more difficult, if not impossible to imagine pan-national identification to develop. 
 
46. Here we do not elaborate on the match between the normative conception of 
'European citizenship' defended here and the empirical reality of the European Union. 
Offhand, however, it seems safe to say that the requirements that are formulated here to 
be able to speak of 'European citizenship', are presently not met within the European 
Union. See for an inquiry into the fit between the concept of liberal democratic European 
citizenship developed here and the actual situation in the European Union: Lehning 
(1997; 1998b). 
 
47. See also Linz (1997: 11). It should be noted that there is a resurgence of nationalism 
among national politicians. The new fashion within welfare states of the EU is for them 
to have become 'communitarians'. The 'good' of 'the great community' that the nation-
state supposedly is, has become a popular theme, and a 'positive' sense of nationalism, or 
in Tony Blair's words, 'enlightened patriotism' among the citizens within a nation-state, 
is bolstered. 
 
48. See for this and the following arguments the study of Van der Eijk and Franklin 
(1996) on the European elections. 
 
49. This is, however, not the only reason a federation may be unstable. See Kymlicka 
(1998) for an argument why a successful multinational federal system is, in fact, likely to 
be unstable. 
 
50. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference for the Study 
  50  
Political Thought on Citizenship and Cosmopolitanism, Wisconsin Historical Society, 
University of Madison, Madison, WI, November 6-8 1998. I am indebted to Glyn 
Morgan for written comments. 
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